Abstract
Introduction
The collaborative, self-organizing environment of the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking (MANET) technology opens the network to numerous security attacks that can actively disrupt the routing protocol and disable communication. Recently, a number of protocols have been proposed to secure the route discovery process in frequently changing MANET topologies. These protocols are designed to perform route discovery only when a source node needs to route packets to a destination; that is, they are reactive routing protocols [1] [2] [3] . Nevertheless, in many cases, proactive discovery of topology can be more efficient; e.g., in networks with low-to medium-mobility, or with high connection rates and frequent communication with a large portion of the network nodes. Furthermore, hybrid routing protocols [4] , which are the middle ground, have been shown to be capable of adapting their operation to achieve the best performance under differing operational conditions through locally proactive and globally reactive operation.
In this paper, we study how to provide secure proactive routing and we propose a proactive MANET protocol that secures the discovery and the distribution of link state information across mobile ad hoc domains. Our goal is to provide correct (i.e., factual), up-to-date, and authentic link state information, robust against Byzantine behavior and failures of individual nodes. The choice of a link state protocol provides such robustness, unlike distance vector protocols [5] , which can be significantly more affected by a single misbehaving node. Furthermore, the availability of explicit connectivity information, present in link state protocols, has additional benefits: examples include the ability of the source to determine and route simultaneously across multiple routes [6] , the utilization of the local topology for efficient dissemination of data [7] or efficient propagation of control traffic [8] . Finally, a wide range of MANET instances is targeted by our design, which avoids restrictive assumptions on the underlying network trust and membership, and does not require specialized node equipment (e.g., GPS or synchronized clocks).
We present here our Secure Link State Protocol (SLSP) for mobile ad hoc networks, which is robust against individual attackers. SLSP shares security goals and bears some resemblance to secure link state routing protocols proposed for the "wired" Internet, but, at the same time, it is tailored to the salient features of the MANET paradigm. More specifically, SLSP does rely on the requirements of the robust flooding protocol [9] , that is, a central entity to distribute all keys throughout the network and the reliable flooding of link state updates throughout the entire network. SLSP does not seek to synchronize the topology maps across all nodes or to support the full exchange of link state databases [10] . Note that nodes cannot be provided with credentials to prove their authorization to advertise specific routing information [11] due to the continuously changing network connectivity and membership. Finally, the participation of nodes in routing does not stem from their possession of credentials [12] , since in MANET, all nodes are expected to equally assist the network operation.
First we present our assumptions and network model, followed by an overview and the definition of SLSP. Next, we discuss a number of relevant issues and conclude by describing related future work.
SLSP Definition
The Secure Link State Protocol (SLSP) for mobile ad hoc networks is responsible for securing the discovery and distribution of link state information. The scope of SLSP may range from a secure neighborhood discovery to a network-wide secure link state protocol. SLSP nodes disseminate their link state updates and maintain topological information for the subset of network nodes within R hops, which is termed as their zone [4] . Nevertheless, SLSP is a self-contained link state discovery protocol, even though it draws from, and naturally fits within, the concept of hybrid routing.
Assumptions and network model
Each node is equipped with a public/private key pair, namely E V and D V , and with a single network interface per node within a MANET domain.
1 Key certification can be provided by a coalition of K nodes and the use of threshold cryptography [15, 13] , the use of local repositories of certificates provided by the network nodes [14] , or a distributed instantiation of a CA [15] .
Nodes are identified by their IP addresses, which may be assigned by a variety of schemes, e.g., dynamically or even randomly [16] . Although E V does not need to be tied to the node's IP address, it could be beneficial to use IP addresses derived from the nodes' public keys [17] . Nodes are equipped with a one-way or hash function H [18, 19] and a public key cryptosystem.
Adversaries may disrupt the protocol operation by exhibiting arbitrary malicious behavior: e.g., replay, forge, corrupt link state updates, try to influence the topology view of benign nodes, or exploit the protocol to mount Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
SLSP is concerned solely with securing the topology discovery; it does not guarantee that adversaries, which complied with its operation during route discovery, would not attempt to disrupt the actual data transmission at a later time. The protection of the data transmission is a distinct problem, which we address in a different publication [6] .
Overview
To counter adversaries, SLSP protects link state update (LSU) packets from malicious alteration, as they propagate across the network. It disallows advertisements of non-existent, fabricated links, stops nodes from masquerading their peers, strengthens the robustness of neighbor discovery, and thwarts deliberate floods of control traffic that exhausts network and node resources.
To operate efficiently in the absence of a central key management, SLSP provides for each node to distribute its public key to nodes within its zone. Nodes periodically broadcast their certified key, so that the receiving nodes validate their subsequent link state updates. As the network topology changes, nodes learn the keys of nodes that move into their zone, thus keeping track of a relatively limited number of keys at every instance.
SLSP defines a secure neighbor discovery that binds each node V to its Medium Access Control (MAC) address and its IP address, and allows all other nodes within transmission range to identify V unambiguously, given that they already have E V .
Nodes advertise the state of their incident links by broadcasting periodically signed link state updates (LSU). SLSP restricts the propagation of the LSU packets to within the zone of their origin node. Receiving nodes validate the updates, suppress duplicates, and relay previously unseen updates that have not already propagated R hops. Link state information acquired from validated LSU packets is accepted only if both nodes incident on each link advertise the same state of the link.
Neighbor Discovery
Each node commits its Medium Access Control (MAC) address and its IP address, the (MAC V , IP V ) pair, to its neighbors by broadcasting signed hello messages. Receiving nodes validate the signature and retain the information; in the case of SUCV addresses [17] the confirmation for the IP address can be done in a memory-less manner.
The proposed binding of the MAC V strengthens the robustness of our scheme, by disallowing nodes from appearing as multiple ones at the data link layer, and by assisting in protection against flooding DoS attacks.
To achieve these goals, we propose that the Neighbor Lookup Protocol (NLP) be an integral part of SLSP. NLP is responsible for the following tasks: (i) maintaining a mapping of MAC and IP layer addresses of the node's neighbors, (ii) identifying potential discrepancies, such as the use of multiple IP addresses by a single data-link interface, and (iii) measuring the rates at which control packets are received from each neighbor, by differentiating the traffic primarily based on MAC addresses. The measured rates of incoming control packets are provided to the routing protocol. This way, control traffic originating from nodes that selfishly or maliciously attempt to overload the network can be discarded.
Basically, NLP extracts and retains the 48-bit hardware source address for each received (overheard) frame, along with the encapsulated IP address. This requires a simple modification of the device driver [18] , so that the data link address is "passed up" to the routing protocol along with each packet. With nodes operating in promiscuous mode, the extraction of such pairs of addresses from all overheard packets leads to a significant reduction in the use of the neighbor discovery and query/reply mechanisms for medium access control address resolution.
Each node updates its neighbor table by retaining both, the data-link and the network interface addresses addresses. The mappings between the two addresses are retained in the table as long as transmissions from the corresponding neighboring nodes are overheard; a lost neighbor timeout period 2 is associated with each table entry.
NLP issues a notification to SLSP, according to the content of a received packet, in the event that: (i) a neighbor used an IP address different from the address currently recorded in the neighbor table, (ii) two neighbors used the same IP address (that is, a packet appears to originate from a node that may have "spoofed" an IP address), (iii) a node uses the same medium access control address as the detecting node (in that case, the data link address may be "spoofed"). Upon reception of the notification, the routing protocol discards the packet bearing the address that violated the aforementioned policies.
Link State Updates
Link state updates are identified by the IP address of their originator and a 32-bit sequence number, which provides an ample space of approximately four billion updates. To ensure that the LSU's propagate only within the zone of its origin, i.e., R hops away, the node selects a random number X and calculates a hash chain:
It places X R and X 1 in the zone_radius and the hops_traversed fields of the LSU header, 3 respectively, and sets TTL equal to R-1, with R placed in the R LSU field. Finally, a signature is appended, with the header format is shown in Figure 1 .
Receiving nodes check if they have the public key of the originating node, unless the key is attached to the LSU (see section 2.5 below). For an LSU that has already traveled over i hops (i=R-TTL), if i is less than the radius of the originating node, the packet is not relayed unless H R-i (hops_traversed) equals zone_radius. Each relaying node sets hops_traversed equal to H(hops_traversed), decrements TTL, and rebroadcasts the LSU. The provided information is discarded after a confirmLS timeout, unless both nodes incident on a link report the same state. Finally, NLP notifications result in discarding an update relayed by a misbehaved node. The flooding of the LSU packets renders the protocol resilient against malicious failures (e.g., packet dropping, alteration, or modification of the packet's hops_traversed field). Meanwhile, the localized flooding keeps the transmission and processing overhead low. 3 Hash chains have a wide range of applications; in the MANET context, they have been used to assist in hop count authentication [19] .
Public Key Distribution
Nodes use Public Key Distribution (PKD) packets, or attach their certified keys to LSU packets. PKD packets, shown in Figure 2 , are flooded throughout the zone, or they may be distributed less frequently throughout an extended zone.
The LSU-based key broadcast provides for timely acquisition of the key and thus validation of routing information to nodes that move into a new zone. It also reduces to a great extent the transmission of PKD packets, thus reducing the message complexity. On the other hand, the distribution within an extended zone can reduce the delay of validating new keys when nodes outside a zone eventually enter the zone.
Key broadcasts are timed according to the network conditions and the device characteristics. For example, a node can rebroadcast its key when it detects a substantial change of the topology of its zone; that is, if at least some percentage of nodes has departed from the node's neighborhood since the last key broadcast.
The certificate "vouches" for the public key. Additionally, the authenticity and freshness of the PKD packet are verified by a signature from the node that possesses and distributes the key. The PKD sequence number is set to the next available value, following the increasing values used for LSU packets. When the LSU-based key broadcast is used, no additional PKD signature is required.
Nodes validate PKD packets only if they are not already aware of the originator's public key. Upon validation, E V and the corresponding source IP address are stored locally, along with the corresponding sequence number. 4 Each node can autonomously decide whether to validate a key broadcast or not. For example, if it communicates with a nearby destination, it might have no incentive to validate a PKD that originates from a node a large distance away. Similarly, a validation could be avoided if the node considers its topology view broad enough, or sufficient to support its communication. This could happen for a dense network or zone, when not all physically present links are necessary.
Protection from clogging DoS attacks
In order to guarantee the responsiveness of the routing protocol, nodes maintain a priority ranking of their neighbors according to the rate of queries observed by NLP. The highest priority is assigned to the nodes generating (or relaying) requests with the lowest rate and vice versa. Quanta are allocated proportionally to the priorities and non-serviced, low-priority
